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ABSTRACT 
The paper reflects a basic premise: Greek participation in the Euro-zone 
marked a definitive institutional break in the process of contracting and 
managing public debt. Instead of internal debt, used extensively in 
earlier decades, euro-denominated sovereign issues were now placed in 
the international market. Thus, the Greek state became a net ‘exporter’ 
of financial claims to an extent unprecedented in its recent history. In 
assessing the prolegomena to crisis, I offer a review of the post-junta, 
pre-euro period, the forces leading to accumulation of (mostly internal) 
debt and the predominance of a ‘money illusion’ in distributional 
politics; I also engage an argument that the institutional shift that 
occurred with Euro-zone entry brought about a fundamental change to 
the very ‘sovereignty’ of Greek public debt. It expunged ‘money illusion’ 
but created the ground for policies that embodied ‘financial’ and ‘fiscal’ 
illusions.  The entrapment of elites and electorates in various ‘illusions’ 
reflected a persistent tendency to underestimate the limits imposed by 
globalization on Greek economic policies. In the euro era, Greek policy 
became trapped in a self-feeding loop of debt-driven growth that 
effectively undermined the country’s sovereignty. 
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Growth, Debt and Sovereignty 




Participation in the European Monetary Union was a landmark 
development for Greece. It bestowed on its government and private 
sectors a rare historical privilege: the ability to borrow in open financial 
markets on the same terms as other Union members, without the 
encumbrance of exchange risk.  
To gain that status, Greece had undertaken successful stabilization 
policies in 1996-2000, bringing under control long-standing public 
deficits, domestic inflation and the drachma exchange rate. An 
important part of pre-entry policy was the liberalization of capital flows 
and of the domestic financial sector. Contrary to prior fears of risk of 
capital flight, significant inflows occurred in the late 1990s. The Greek 
financial sector (stock exchange, mutual funds and commercial banks) 
flourished. Domestic financial flows (credit, savings and stockholding) 
boomed. Investment and growth accelerated. On the eve of EMU 
membership, Greece was nothing less than a star performer in Europe1. 
Nine years later the privilege became a curse. In the midst of a deep 
international financial crisis, the Greek State found itself over-borrowed 
with Greek external payments registering their largest gap since the 
1970s. Greece was expunged from financial markets and its outstanding 
bonds devalued substantially. Currency devaluation was impossible 
                                                 
1
 See for example OECD [2000] Country Report: Greece 
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within the Euro-zone. The lack of European institutional machinery for 
tackling macroeconomic crises proved critical, heightening uncertainty 
both in Greece and Europe. Greece suffered large capital flight because 
of this, throughout the period of the crisis.  
In mid-2010, an ad-hoc program of official loans (that would eventually 
exceed 250 billion euro) was put together by Euro-zone governments 
and the IMF. This program imposed heavy conditionality on Greece for 
rapid fiscal adjustment and structural reform. As the program came too 
late, had a short horizon and was heavily front-loaded, it created a 
demand shock and failed to reduce uncertainty. Capital flight worsened, 
Greece suffered a severe liquidity crisis and the economy sank into a 
great depression. Between 2009 and 2014 GDP declined by 25 percent 
and unemployment soared to 26 percent. Social unrest and political 
conflict inflated the intrinsic uncertainties of the Greek predicament, 
postponing hopes of early recovery.  The Greek crisis has now flared up 
again after the recent election in January 2015 of a government of the 
Greek left for the first time after the Civil War of the 1940s.  This 
government is now attempting to reverse the austerity imposed by 
earlier conditionality, under very adverse economic and diplomatic 
circumstances. In a sense, the dire present condition represents the full 
transformation of fiscal to political crisis within Europe. It underlines 
further the need to understand the prolegomena to the crisis. 
The metamorphosis of a financial privilege to a fiscal curse is a complex 
historical outcome. The worst global financial crisis in eighty years, the 
absence of Euro-zone arrangements for insurance against 
macroeconomic risks, misguided Greek policies and long-standing fault 
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lines in Greek public and social structures jointly produced the curse that 
has now morphed into a great depression.  
In complex outcomes, it is possible to isolate one aspect and construct 
reductionist argument. North European elites, for example, have 
promoted a narrative of bad Greek policies and unproductive social 
habits. Populists in Greece put the blame on German imperialism; left 
analysts have criticized Euro-zone architecture for Greek indebtedness 
[Lapavitsas 2011]. The present Greek governing coalition persuaded the 
electorate that the blame is on post-crisis policies, which they are now 
attempting to reverse.  Among scholarly critics of the endogenous 
weaknesses of Greek development, some have chosen to focus on policy 
after euro-zone accession [Christodoulakis 2012, Voulgaris 2012] while 
others refresh the perspective of long-enduring structural deformities of 
the political and economic system [Featherstone 2012, Kazakos 2012]. In 
a notable exception to contemporary narrative, Dertilis (2013) looks 
over two centuries and underlines persistent factors that have thrown 
Greece into recurring fiscal crises. This perspective reconstructs deep 
links between chronic indebtedness, military expenditure, war and 
geopolitics.  
In the modern era wars, and especially the world wars, bequeathed a 
heritage of heavy public indebtedness. Monetary instabilities and 
reforms have been a constant aftermath of war as a result. In the post-
world war II era nonetheless, Europe has enjoyed a very long period 
without war within its borders (excepting Yugoslavia in the 1990s). 
European integration and Monetary Union represent a project with a 
deep long-term objective: economic cooperation and monetary stability 
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as banishment of war. The destabilization of European economies since 
2008 has not been the outcome of war but of financial crisis. Joining the 
European Union at first and the euro-zone later Greece partook in the 
geopolitical security of the European project. This implies that the state 
of over-indebtedness has not been the outcome of shocks, such as war 
preparations, but an endogenous accumulation over a period of peace2.  
My inquiry is therefore focused on peace-time over-indebtedness and 
the incentives, policy failures and structural fault lines that conspired to 
produce a new tragedy for Greece. Inasmuch as over-indebtedness 
poses a deep threat to the sovereignty of any state, very simple 
questions arise:  Why and how can the elites managing the state violate 
limits of prudence that ensure its (and their) self-preservation? Why and 
how do informed citizens in a democracy, who aspire to break out from 
the status of superpower client, opt for choices that lead to renewed 
external dependence?  The organization of this paper reflects the 
premise that Greek participation in the Euro-zone marked a definitive 
institutional break in the process of contracting and managing public 
debt. Given this premise, I undertake an analysis of modalities that make 
up the prolegomena to the Greek crisis of 2010.  
The second section reviews the early post-junta period, summing up 
mechanisms that promoted the accumulation of mostly internal debt. 
This was a period in which politics and social dynamics were mired in a 
‘money illusion’. The third section discusses the period of adjustment 
and growth that paved the way to Greece’s accession to the Euro-zone. 
                                                 
2
 For a broad view on war and debt see Reinhardt and Rogoff [2009]. Focusing on peacetime 
indebtedness the paper does not engage further on the issue of military expenditure as a a propelling 
factor of public borrowing. This does not imply however, that military spending was unimportant in 
the period under review.  
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The fourth section discusses the institutional shifts that occurred with 
Euro-zone entry and the qualitative change to the ‘sovereignty’ of Greek 
public debt. The penultimate section offers an analysis of structures and 
policies that led to a new cycle of debt accumulation while in the euro-
zone, which is characterized as a period of a ‘joint financial and fiscal 
illusion’. The last section concludes with remarks on euphoria, crisis and 
democracy.   
2. Redistribution without Growth: Early Stabilization of 
Democracy with Internal Debt 
 
The restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974 was an uplifting 
milestone for those who experienced it. For the first time since the end 
of World War II the promise of open society was within citizens’ grasp. 
For the citizenry of democratic Greece this was a historic turning point. 
The prospect of openness would materialize with the elimination of 
constraints on domestic politics (no banned parties, no ideological and 
political barriers) and with European integration on the international 
front.  
Coming out of dictatorship, Greeks had a deep-felt vision of breaking 
international dependency on the US which, as many believed, was 
responsible for the colonel’s junta. European integration was the route 
by which a small peripheral country could escape the status of 
superpower client, a condition which underpinned both the Civil War of 
1946-48 and the illiberal anti-communist democracy that prevailed in its 
aftermath. 
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The historic achievement of post-junta democracy was not simply the 
restoration of liberal politics but also a newfound drive for social 
inclusiveness. A new state of political participation was achieved through 
the empowerment of social organizations such as labor and university 
student unions. Empowerment implied agendas seeking the expansion 
of social controls in the economy that translated into a constantly 
growing perimeter of the public sector. This outcome was not simply 
grounded in political ideology. It intertwined with long-repressed social 
aspirations for redistribution of power and wealth. The years since the 
Civil War had seen the accumulation of repressed demands for 
redistribution and democratic participation, as the State had created a 
divisive social structure: it offered protections and privileges to one part 
of the population while persecuting the other. This amounted to a 
deeply illiberal and regulated order in which neither liberal politics nor 
markets could function effectively.   
The energy crisis of the early seventies put an end to the era of 
prosperity in the West and, along with it, to the Greek ‘economic 
miracle’ of the 1960s. Thus, democratization in Greece came at a time of 
burgeoning social need in a system that had been exclusive, unequal and 
repressive from inception3. Accordingly there was a perception across 
the political spectrum that the young democracy was fragile and that 
special measures were required to consolidate it. On the internal front, 
protection of incomes and employment led to inevitable increases in 
                                                 
3
 Yannis Voulgaris believes that Greek ‘populist largesse’ in the period of democratic consolidation 
was excessive as compared to analogous conditions in Portugal and Spain. The reinstatement of 
democratic rights in the two other Mediterranean democracies was probably more heavily weighted 
in citizen aspirations since the repressed demand for ‘political goods’ had gone on much longer in 
these societies. In any case, Voulgaris’ point is vindicated, as post-dictatorship fiscal expansions were 
noticeable in both countries but were also brought under control much sooner than in Greece. See 
my comparative analysis in Thomadakis [2006]. 
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public expenditure, focused on social transfers and on bailouts of 
insolvent firms which leaned heavily on state-owned banks. On the 
external front, rapid accession to the European Community was the 
strategy that was hoped to bolster institutional stability and geopolitical 
security.  
These broad strategic choices however imposed inescapable collateral 
requirements for the economic order and its institutional arrangements. 
Tax reforms were needed to accommodate the funding of expanded 
public expenditure. Administrative reforms were needed to raise the 
effectiveness of social spending in combating inequality. Microeconomic 
reforms, mainly industrial policy, were also required to restructure 
industrial and service sectors for competing in the open European 
economy.  The inability to fulfill these collateral requirements is really 
the story of bypassed or unfinished reforms, the missed opportunities 
for building a solid economic foundation to the new Greek democracy, in 
short, the dark side of Greek politics that paved the way to crisis.  
Let me offer two examples of unfinished reform. In the area of 
productive restructuring, initiatives for large projects, which were 
sponsored by the public sector and would serve as the core of new 
development, were undertaken in 1982-84.  Industrialization of mineral 
resources such as bauxite, technological innovations in areas with large 
domestic demand such as telecom and transport equipment, and 
infrastructural initiatives were planned but hardly ever materialized. The 
failure was largely due to financial shortage; Greek banks were 
overburdened with bailouts of moribund firms; credible foreign partners 
were wary of Greek economic conditions and political intentions. An 
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International financial crunch was also proceeding due to the adoption 
of severe monetary policies in the US in the early 1980s. 
In the area of fiscal reform, stabilization policy undertaken in 1985 by 
economy minister Simitis met with fierce opposition from both within 
and outside the governing party, in a rhetorical hailstorm that equated 
fiscal consolidation to suppression of popular rights. This was destined 
to be a permanent motto in polemics against fiscal control, perpetuating 
the illusion that fiscal balance was a reactionary trick rather than a 
necessity for the reproduction of the state. Stabilization policy appeared 
to bear fruit in mid-1987, but was overturned as elections and the threat 
of political defeat for PASOK loomed, two years later.  
Table 1 presents summary indices of economic performance through the 
end of the 1980s. (Please see Appendix A) 
Reform projects in the Greek public space have proved to be a Sisyphean 
adventure. The tendency to abandon semi-finished projects under 
political pressure became symptoms of the emergence of 
macroeconomic populism in Greece, a form quite distinct from 
traditional clientelism.  This involved   the use of macroeconomic policy 
for the attainment of mass political outcomes4. The consolidation of a 
strongly bi-partisan political system, the empowerment of mass 
organizations of social representation (labor, public employees, farmers, 
small businessmen, industrialists) and the absence of a stable 
institutional mooring for social protection were the foundations on 
which the new populism was erected. Its major manifestation was the 
                                                 
4
 For a discussion of Macroeconomic Populism see  Dornbusch [1991] 
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emergence of a strong electoral-fiscal cycle5. This involved systematic 
fiscal expansions shortly before election periods, either catering to 
demands for redistribution or attempting to enhance growth by 
injections of public money into the economy.  I have estimated 
elsewhere that over the 20 years 1974-93, each of the seven electoral 
contests increased the public deficit by 1.83 percent of GDP on average, 
which implies that pre-election populism alone translated into 
cumulative deficits of about 13 percent of GDP6.   
The displacement of economic reform by macroeconomic populism 
amounted to a historic failure of the reestablished democratic order in 
Greece. It allowed the perpetuation of public and external deficits.  It 
also allowed the systematic use of ‘stopgap’ measures of fiscal and 
monetary management as an escape valve: accumulation of public debt 
on one hand, currency devaluation on the other. Neither was part of 
true strategic management. They were last-resort measures that made 
up for the lack of coherent policy; nevertheless, they offered political 
advantage as they facilitated macroeconomic populism: their long-term 
implications were hidden behind the ‘money veil’. This kept alive the 
fiscal illusion, and its attendant political culture, that deficits did not 
matter. Diagram 1 shows the cumulative outcome of these policies. 
(Please see Appendix A) 
The increase in public indebtedness until the mid-1990s was primarily 
funded from domestic sources7. It therefore tended to restrain 
investment and growth, producing stagflation and cultivating a culture 
                                                 
5
 The argument was empirically developed earlier in Thomadakis and Seremetis [1992]. 
6
 This estimation comes from Thomadakis [1997], p. 55. 
7
 External debt amounted to 25 percent of GDP at the end of the 1990s. BANK OF GREECE, Governor’s 
Report [1999] p. 241. 
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of distributional struggles: the salaried classes pressed for higher wages. 
The professional classes resisted taxation and lobbied for political 
controls of prices, incomes and competition. Businesses also fought 
against increased taxes: large ones by political interconnection and small 
ones by withdrawing into the ‘underground’ economy and the non-
tradable sector8. In effect the missing taxes were reincarnated as 
inflation, devaluation and high nominal interest rates. The whole system 
was mired in money illusion: political parties would promise prosperity 
and social movements would bask in gains from ‘democratic struggles’ 
all in nominal terms. In reality redistribution and social policy were 
constructed on deficits, currency devaluation and debt9.  
 
3. Stabilization and Reform: Growth and the Risk of Openness   
 
The end of the decade of the 1980s was marked by political crisis in 
Greece fuelled by scandals and scandal-mongering. Yet, the true 
challenge of the time was a full-fledged fiscal crisis in 1989-90, when the 
public deficit climbed to 15 percent of GDP and forced the government 
to borrow at exorbitant cost, to obtain an EU loan and to undertake 
strict measures for fiscal retrenchment, including the first privatizations 
of public sector companies. The shock ushered in a decade of economic 
adjustment that would eventually lead to Greek entry in the Euro-zone. 
In fact, the adjustment of the 1990s was so effective that, by the middle 
                                                 
8
 See Doxiadis [2010] for a perspective on family enterprise and small entrepreneurs   as contributors 
to the growing perimeter of the non-tradable   sector. In my view, the underground economy 
operated as an area   of ‘natural’ protection from intensifying international competition. See 
Thomadakis [2011], ‘introductory remarks’. 
9
 See Thomadakis and Seremetis ibid. pp. 244-7. 
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of the decade, Greece began to partake in global growth trends and to 
attract private capital inflows, a confidence vote missed since the 1960s. 
Investment accelerated, deficits came under control and inflation 
started to converge to European levels. Basic indices of economic 
performance in 1991-2000 are summarized in table 2. (Please see 
Appendix A) 
The transition from stagflation to growth was doubtlessly helped by 
modest tax reforms and enforcement which raised the ratio of tax 
revenues to GDP, as seen in the table. Nevertheless tax revenues only 
gradually caught up with the persistent rise in expenditure, so that 
public debt would not stabilize until the later part of the 1990s.   
Fiscal stabilization and the inflows from European funds enabled the 
revival of public investment through large new infrastructural projects 
(e.g. roads, airports, urban transit)10. These mostly promoted the 
international ‘connectivity’ of the economy by improving domestic and 
international transportation facilities.  Improvements in outward looking 
capabilities were a double-edged instrument: they facilitated the 
movement of exports but also the penetration of imports. Thus, they 
could accommodate either a potential export or an import boom (or 
both). As things developed, it was an import boom that prevailed11. In 
any case, these infrastructures fed also into the medium-term prospect 
of higher economic efficiency. Thus, twenty whole years after 
democratization, an important cornerstone of economic restructuring 
was finally pursued with ample European assistance.  
                                                 
10
 For the contribution of EU funds to the Greek balance of payments and growth see Manassaki and 
Koltsida [2010]. As a general magnitude, EU transfers have amounted regularly to 4-5 percent of GDP 
per year.  
11
 I am indebted to Eliza Papadaki for this point.  
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Probably the most important structural change in the period of 
adjustment was a far-reaching reform of the financial sector. This was 
the single most successful ‘industrial policy’ undertaken by the Greek 
governing elites that paved the way for capital inflows and a renewal of 
Greek participation in the fast-growing international financial system of 
that period. The process of financial reform followed a blueprint 
analogous to what other western countries had followed earlier. 
Liberalizations of banking and the stock exchange were achieved 
through a wave of deregulation in the early 1990s12. Regulatory 
arrangements for the new ‘liberalized’ financial order came with a delay 
and would be completed only by the end of the decade13. This implied 
that financial liberalization proceeded with few regulatory constraints 
initially, and this allowed the embedding of behaviors and strategies that 
would make the financial system more prone to instabilities14. 
 In any case, there were tangible benefits of financial reform. First, banks 
managed to break the long servitude to government which state 
ownership and top-heavy regulation had imposed for many decades, 
managing at the same time to outgrow the semi-bankrupt status to 
which they had been relegated since the 1980s. Second, they fulfilled 
the necessary conditions for a wave of large privatizations of erstwhile 
public companies in telecommunications, energy, electricity and other 
utilities. Third, financial reform transformed the Greek economy into an 
attractive location for foreign portfolio investments. Fourth, it enabled 
Greek banks to export capital and services to the newly opened Balkan 
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 Karatzas Report [1987] 
13
 For a summary of the corpus of new market regulation in 1996-2002, see Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission [2003]   
14
 For an early prophetic essay on deregulation and instability see Diaz-Alejandro [1985]. 
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region and beyond. This expansion also enabled non-financial firms to 
initiate international expansion and become significant foreign investors 
in South-eastern Europe. Thus, an aura of Greek international influence 
was erected that contributed to the credibility of the Greek claim for 
participation in the ‘European core’.  
Last but not least, another effect of financial reform related to new 
domestic credit patterns. The resurrection of a lively banking sector had 
indirect effects on economic restructuring, not only because it 
encouraged the internationalization of Greek enterprise, but also 
because it determined new patterns in the allocation of credit within the 
economy. Banks competitively pursued the development of new 
business in mortgage finance and consumer credit. Indicatively, of total 
bank lending to the domestic private sector, the stock of mortgage and 
consumer lending rose from about 10 percent in 1988 to 24 percent in 
1998 and to 49 percent in 200815. Clearly this was the fastest growing 
area in bank credit before and during the euro era. It represented a 
‘catch-up’ of Greek credit patterns to north European norms. Notably, 
however, it was precisely this credit expansion that enabled strong 
restructuring of domestic demand towards the non-tradable sector 
(housing construction for example) and imports. It is perhaps indicative 
that the spectacular growth of the overall economy did not coincide with 
growing export potential but with an inward-looking re-composition of 
domestic demand, that were no doubt partially attributed to these new 
credit patterns.  
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 Bank of Greece, Statistics on Credit 1980-2014. 
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 Liberalization of capital movements was the necessary complement to 
domestic financial reform and capital inflows materialized in large scale 
especially as stabilization of the drachma was achieved in 199816. 
Inasmuch as capital inflows were directed to private sector assets, there 
was space created for the stabilization of public debt. Privatizations of 
public sector companies alone amounted to about 25 billion euro over 
the period 1997-200117; these enabled substantial reductions in the 
stock of public debt. The financial boom of the late 1990s also 
contributed to increased revenues from profit taxes on newly listed 
companies, stock exchange transaction taxes and related sources.18   
Furthermore, the acceleration of economic growth, domestic 
transactions and incomes also improved indirect and direct tax receipts.  
In Diagram 2 are shown fiscal and debt magnitudes as they evolved in 
the period preceding Greece’s Euro-zone entry. (Please see Appendix A) 
The virtuous picture of Diagram 2 presented a stark contrast to 
economic performance of the prior decades. But it had a dark side too. 
As in so many other cases, financial liberalization also opened Greece to 
the vicissitudes of short-term capital movements, and a large financial 
bubble made its appearance in 1998-2000, in tandem with analogous 
phenomena in other countries19. The burst of the Greek stock exchange 
bubble in 2000 coincided with that of the internet bubble in the US. 
Although this did not affect materially macroeconomic and fiscal 
                                                 
16
 Bank of Greece, Governor’s Reports 1998-2000, especially sections on the capital account of the 
balance of payments.  
17
 Author estimate based on Hellenic Capital Market Commission’s annual reports, various years. 
18
 I thank Vassilis Rapanos for bringing this point to my attention. 
19
 It is common knowledge that stock markets experienced bubbles around the world in the 1990s. 
These were abruptly reversed in the period 2000-2001. That stock market cycle has been since 
characterized as the ‘internet bubble’, despite the fact that it engulfed whole markets and not just 
internet stocks.  
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performance, it carried an important implication. Its deeper significance 
was that private securities issued in Greece lost a portion of their ‘export 
potential’ and would soon be superseded by another, presumably more 
secure and therefore more powerful, financial export:  the sovereign 
securities issued by the government in international markets which took 
off for good in the era of the euro. Even this however had a dark side, 
mainly because of the high levels of public debt that were inherited from 
earlier periods as shown in Diagram 2. High levels of inherited debt 
exercise a direct influence on policy choices and political incentives even 
in periods of ‘virtuous cycles’ such as the one that was initiated in 
Greece in the mid-1990s. I return to this point below. 
In summary, Greece made a remarkable adjustment in the 1990s, 
involving both reform and improved fiscal enforcement, which was to a 
large extent incentivized by consensus around the goal of euro-zone 
entry.  Despite the unhappy economic heritage of the early post-junta 
years, Greece managed to become once again a growth economy. At the 
epicenter stood the radical change of the financial sector and the 
transformation of Greek financial assets into exportable values. Capital 
inflows for the acquisition of Greek financial assets (in private companies 
or privatizing public enterprises including banks) supported domestic 
liquidity and investment. They enabled the stabilization of public debt 
relative to a GDP that had now acquired a growth dynamic. However, 
they also exposed the economy to the prospect of instability due to 
sudden capital flow reversals and, more generally, due to the volatility of 
global financial markets and speculative movements. The burst of the 
Greek stock market bubble of 1998-2000 had offered a palpable 
foretaste of this risk. 
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4. Institutional Fault Lines in Euro-zone Architecture and the 
Management of Risks 
 
The burst of the Greek stock market bubble Euro-zone entry had large 
implications for the institutions of national economic policy and the 
margins of policy discretion, especially for small member states as 
Greece.  Monetary policy was ceded to the European Central Bank. 
Monetization of debts and currency devaluations were removed from 
the toolkit of the government. These were the very tools that the Greek 
Republic had used extensively in the period of democratic consolidation 
in lieu of reforms in taxation, public spending and industrial structure. 
Prima facie the elimination of these tools created renewed pressure for 
reform.  
However, the elimination of monetary sovereignty was accompanied by 
a ‘sweetener’: the ability to issue liabilities without exchange risk, i.e. to 
borrow in the common currency. This meant that a previous barrier to 
market access was removed for both the government and private 
agents. The removal of the exchange-risk barrier was unprecedented in 
Greece’s modern history, which has been crowded with recurring 
monetary crises. Yet, there was an important converse side which 
amounted to a qualitative change in the ‘sovereignty’ of sovereign debt. 
Monetary and debt sovereignty are intertwined. Without the former, 
there is great limitation in the latter. Once Greece entered the Eurozone 
the distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ debt ceased. The 
government could service, refinance, or default on its debts but could 
not unilaterally monetize them. Furthermore, fiscal policy was restrained 
as deficit constraints were part and parcel of the euro-pact. The (quite 
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arbitrary) deficit limit of 3 percent of GDP left very little space even for 
counter-cyclical policies. It mandated that member states found in 
violation would be subjected to an ‘excessive deficit procedure’ enforced 
by the European Commission. For a country with the behavioral record 
of Greece, these limitations implied no less than a full revamping of 
fiscal management, including the tax and social security systems, 
expenditure management, especially social transfers and military 
outlays.   
A distinction is important: Whereas the monetary constraint is a 
constitutional rule that carries monetary policy to a supra-national level, 
the fiscal constraint operates through discretionary actions of member 
states and the regulatory intervention of the Commission. This has 
enabled various degrees of flexibility and ‘interpretation’ which 
devolved on the relative power of states vis a vis the European 
Commission. Already by 2003-4 Germany and France violated the fiscal 
limit, but they escaped the ‘excess deficit procedure’ because of their 
political weight. These exceptions reduced visibly the power of the 
Commission as enforcer of the Treaty and created a double standard. 
Smaller states, such as Greece, did not have the same treatment. Yet, 
the double standard boosted perverse incentives to engage in creative 
accounting.  
Euro-zone architecture was decidedly a ‘fair weather’ system that would 
work well in normal times but had no machinery to deal with serious 
crisis20. The absence of any mechanism of co-insurance on public debt of 
member states; the lack of a mechanism for outright fiscal transfers to 
                                                 
20
 See for example ‘mainstream’ critiques in Wyplosz [2006], Lane [2012]. 
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buffer local shocks, as would exist in a federal state; the explicit 
prohibition to the Central Bank to purchase public debt outright; the 
famous ‘no bailout’ clause of the Treaty, all these meant one thing only: 
Macroeconomic, banking, and broader financial risks remained 
absolutely within the responsibilities of member states.  
If crises were singular and diversifiable events in specific member-states, 
the arrangement could probably survive: any state facing distress could 
seek emergency funding in the markets, paying the proper premium, 
and so being ‘disciplined’ by the market. In that fashion, market 
discipline would enforce fiscal discipline. If however markets themselves 
failed, crises of a systemic nature could arise (as the present one) and 
governments would be unable to fund themselves at any price! But 
then, there was no Euro-zone insurance facility to fill the gap. Nor was 
there a capability to mutualize a portion of national debts, so that the 
problem member-state could avoid default. 
This lop-sided vision of monetary union would have been workable 
either if the virtuous policies imposed by the Treaty were sufficient to 
expunge forever the possibility of a large crisis, an expectation that could 
only be ascribed to policy arrogance and historical ignorance; or if all 
member states, besides being virtuous about deficits, worked to build up 
enough reserve resources as self-insurance against the risk of a major 
shock. Building public self-insurance capacity however was not equally 
accessible for member states, due to opposing external positions, with 
some being persistently ‘surplus’ and some being ‘deficit’ states in the 
course of the normal function of the Euro-zone. That feature clearly 
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foreshadowed the present divide between ‘north’ and ‘south’ in the 
zone of the euro.  
 
5. Greece in the Euro-zone: Growth Traps and the Sirens of Debt 
 
5.1 Post-entry performance, the exhaustion of consensus and market 
complacency 
At the point of entry in the Euro-zone Greece was a star performer with 
an impressive rate of growth and   a track record of fiscal adjustment 
after many years of persistent deficits. Its weakness was high public 
indebtedness, around 100 percent of GDP, and a persistent deficit in 
current external payments counterbalanced by export of financial 
claims, private and public. These weaknesses were well known to 
policymakers and market agents. However, the international 
environment was growth-friendly. The advanced economies were 
basking in the comforts of the ‘Great Moderation’; financial markets 
were enjoying euphorically low interest rates, after the market crashes 
in 2000-2001 had prompted an increase in Central Bank liquidity. Faith in 
the ‘safety’ of sovereign debt securities was reinforced. Risk – premia on 
Euro-zone debt issues had practically vanished, including Greek ones.  
Diagram 3 shows Greek 10-year bond spreads over German rates in the 
1997- 2009; critical fiscal magnitudes as tax receipts, social expenditures, 
and employee compensation in the public sector; primary fiscal deficits 
(i.e. results before interest payments on public debt) and current 
account deficits, all as a percentage of GDP. (Please see Appendix A) 
The yield curve in panel A reveals that, in effect, Greek bonds were a 
very close substitute of German issues; the markets assessed almost no 
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risk-premium on Greek borrowing between 2001 and 2007. This flew in 
the face of publicly known Greek weaknesses. Additional considerations 
from that period can be gathered from panels B and C of Diagram 3.  
In panel B, tax receipts as percentage of GDP peaked in 2000 but 
declined and stabilized at a lower level thereafter; public employee 
compensation was stable from 1997 to 2001 but shifted to a growing 
path thereafter; and social expenditure was steadily increasing 
throughout. In fact, it expanded faster than any other expenditure, 
gaining about 10 percentage points of GDP over 2000-9. An obvious 
conclusion is that Greece had attained its goal of euro-zone entry with 
maximum fiscal effort, but that post-entry fiscal management relaxed, 
foreshadowing a renewed deficit cycle. Pre-entry discipline gave way to 
a renewal of distributional pressure. I will come back to the political-
economic and social interpretations of these observations below.  
In panel C we note additional critical signs. The first is that over the 
period 1997-2003 the primary fiscal balance (expenditures before 
interest less receipts) was in surplus, enabling reduced net borrowing for 
government. In part the surplus was the result of financial activities (a 
stock market boom) that reached unprecedented levels in that period. 
As this waned however, and as funds from privatizations came to a halt, 
borrowing requirements increased rapidly, creating a new upward trend 
in public debt. The turnaround from primary surplus to deficit occurred 
in 2003-4. Last, but not least, the external current account deficit did 
show small improvement until 2004 but worsened considerably 
afterwards, moving rapidly far beyond 5 percent of GDP. With hindsight, 
these signs were clear precursors of the crisis in 2009. But, even without 
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hindsight, the shifts were decisive and concurrent enough to instill 
doubts about the prospective performance of a country entering the 
Euro-zone with an overhang of high public debt.  
In sum, on the basis of publicly available macroeconomic information, 
there was a visible transition from stability to deteriorating trends in 
2003-4. Yet, as can be clearly discerned in panel A, this shift made no 
impression on the markets: the risk-premium on Greek debt remained 
very low until 2008. How could that be and why did not market discipline 
provide Greece with counter-incentives to the accumulation of debt?  
There are plausible complementary explanations to this question. The 
first is that markets were euphoric and risk factors were discounted in 
the context of buoyant market sentiment. The successful execution of 
the Olympic Games in 2004 added to Greece’s international luster and 
offered an alibi to fiscal derailment as a temporary displacement. 
Greece, after all, maintained a high rate of growth until 2007 and this 
calmed fears of a serious macro-economic turndown21.  Furthermore, 
the Commission had placed Greece under supervision in 2004, after the 
newly elected government had revised upward previous deficits, 
changing accounting conventions related to military expenditure22.  It 
was generally assumed that Commission pressure would result in 
                                                 
21
 The general euphoria of the two decades ending in 2007 has also been characterized as the 
‘Greenspan put’ implying that US monetary policy was feeding expectations that crises would be 
effectively absorbed by policies of monetary expansion. 
22 In 2004, newly elected finance minister George Alogoskoufis fashioned a ‘fiscal census’ which 
imposed new accounting rules that increased past deficits and embellished the picture for his own 
term. This exercise posed for the first time the issue of whether Greece had entered the Euro-zone on 
false data. This would be correlated later to the furor over ‘Greek statistics’ in 2009.  See  European 
Commission [2010] “Report On Greek Government 
Deficit and Debt Statistics”.  See also a later response by ex-prime minister Simitis [2011] who noted 
that most of the change in 2004 was due to a reshuffling of the accounting treatment for military 
expenses. 
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reinstating balance in Greek fiscal affairs. But, conversely also, 
Commission pressure was probably tempered by the fact that market 
perceptions of increasing Greek risks were non-existent. Lastly, and 
more importantly, European bank regulators continued to encourage 
the holding of sovereign issues as virtually riskless assets for bank 
portfolios; banks therefore received a strong incentive to load up on 
sovereign euro-zone debt, including Greek issues. In the circumstances, 
Greece could manage Commission pressures for fiscal adjustment by 
continuing to have privileged access to markets for its sovereign issues.  
The configuration of market optimism and correlated policy choices was 
the fundamental reason for Greek debt to continue to enjoy subsidized 
rates. In my opinion, the key to the low risk-assessment on the part of 
financial markets was the maintenance of the Greek rate of growth at a 
level among the highest in Europe. This acted as a strong palliative to 
pessimist fears, keeping them from surfacing as long as growth was 
maintained.  Greek political elites clearly perceived the centrality of 
growth as a passport to subsidized borrowing, implicitly assuming this 
was a permanent feature of markets. Yet, underlying trends were 
worrisome as the process of growth did not correlate with increasing 
fundamental strength of domestic production and industrial 
restructuring [Pitelis, 2012]. Rather, growth hinged on increased 
consumption which was import-based, and increased investment in non-
tradables  (e.g. housing construction) which did not enhance 
international competitiveness. Thus, the rate of growth was contingent 
on the ability of Greece to obtain increasing amounts of external finance 
and this increased the risks against an international financial crisis.  In 
effect, a self-feeding loop – an incipient growth trap - lurked below the 
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surface of market calm: growth was dependent on continued external 
finance but the sustainability of external finance was itself based on 
maintaining perceptions of growth. So when growth was endangered 
from external causes, i.e. the spreading financial crisis beginning in 2008, 
the whole ‘fair weather’ loop of growth and cheap debt was threatened 
from both sides. The prospect of failing external demand put downward 
pressure on growth and financial market failures put simultaneously 
upward pressures on interest rates and risk-premia. The Greek risks that 
had remained unrecognized that far, loomed and became a stark reality. 
Was Greece in a position to handle such a double squeeze? Its only 
realistic option was in the direction of regaining fiscal balance. Yet, as we 
see below, the opposite course was followed.  
5.2 The early triumph of stasis 
Whether the shift away from fiscal balance shortly after euro-zone entry 
was indeed a transitory phenomenon, as markets appeared to assume, 
or whether they expressed deeper and more permanent pressures is 
critical for any analysis. We must turn to Greek idiosyncratic features to 
assess this question. It is important to consider whether the high rate of 
growth for the economy as a whole offered restitution to long-standing 
structural and behavioral weaknesses or whether, on the contrary, it 
provided an incentive to complacency about needed reform.  
Once again, let us recall that Greece gained admission to the Euro-zone 
in 2001 carrying mixed baggage: the heritage of its earlier failures was 
reflected in high public debt and uncompetitive productive structures 
except in services and finance where competitive advantages can be 
very volatile; more recent credentials encompassed fiscal adjustment, 
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debt stabilization and growth performance. Its subsequent course as 
Euro-zone member would be marred by the tension between these two 
legacies. For example, the persistent proliferation of very small firms and 
a large stratum of self-employed professionals in the social structure 
meant that large areas of economic activity remained below the radar of 
tax authorities. This led to a persistent deficiency in tax (and social 
security) collections and to inability of the tax revenues to follow the 
growth of private incomes in the normal course of events. Every time 
that tax revenues increased relative to GDP, this was the result of 
extraordinary measures and effort rather than normal function23.  By the 
same token, the same strata of small firms and self-employed 
professionals also clamored for political protection, unable as they were 
to face competition in the renewed opening of the economy after Euro-
zone entry. In fact, as the worsening balance of payments testifies, the 
non-tradable sectors were growing more rapidly than the export sector 
which meant that growing volumes of labor and capital were acting 
within ‘protected’ spaces in the economy. Protection however does not 
come for free. How would its costs be funded, given the elimination of 
monetary sovereignty and the deficit constraints?  And if protection 
were indeed provided using up resources that should be held in reserve 
in good times, what would happen in bad times?  
It is notable that, besides marginal changes in taxation, reforms in the 
public sector that would respond to the new institutional requirements 
of the Euro-zone were not forthcoming. A prime example was the 
cancellation of proposed social security reform in 2001. The need for 
                                                 
23
 See Kaplanoglou and Rapanos [2013] 
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such reform had been signaled at least since 199024. Demographic 
change, underground employment, a mosaic of early retirement options 
and special pensions and the long period of stagnation had made the 
existing ‘pay-as-you-go’ system increasingly untenable, producing ever 
larger deficits which fed the demand for public debt.  
After many ineffective attempts at reform, a well-rounded proposal was 
put out for public dialogue, soon after Euro-zone entry. Instead of 
dialogue however, the plan was literally shouted down by a tremendous 
alliance of voices (labor unions, the left within and outside the then 
governing socialist party, public employees, small businessmen and even 
university students). After such vociferous opposition it was retracted25. 
This was a symbolic ‘tour de force’ by powerful social and political 
groups who vented their displeasure at the ‘sacrifices’ that were 
imposed in order to gain euro-zone entry. The cancellation of the plan 
was a resounding victory of short-termism, a refusal to come to grips 
with realities that would sooner or later catch up with the economy and 
with the fundamental issue of burdens on future, politically 
unrepresented, generations. The argument behind the refusal was 
simple: social security deficits had to be financed from the public 
budget. But this only rolled over the problem to another level. Thus, the 
most important system for social protection was left in a perilous 
condition, accumulating risks and finally surfacing forcibly in the midst of 
the crisis of 2009. This was the clearest example not only of a lack of 
foresight but also of the expectations of social actors who perceived  
pre-euro fiscal adjustment as a temporary retreat that should be 
                                                 
24
 See Angelopoulos Commission [1990] 
25
 See a protagonist’s view in Giannitsis [2011]. 
  26 
rectified. It was the resounding symptom of a more general social 
attitude of stasis and resistance to premeditated reform, before an 
actual crisis hits. The shelving of social security reform signaled a 
broader defeat of the reformist stance of the Simitis government. 
5.3  Autonomous fiscal expansion by a Eurozone member: a reckless 
response to declining growth 
The widely held expectation of a return to normal ways (which meant 
early abandonment of the pre-entry consensus on fiscal discipline) along 
with the flawed system of fiscal control determined the character of the 
transition that is visible in the data in 2003-4. This was no temporary 
hiatus but the prelude to a new fiscal derailment. The conservative 
government of Kostas Karamanlis came to power in mid-2004 promising 
fiscal rectitude and public reform. They managed to maintain a 
reasonable fiscal condition and stable debt until 2006, but lost control 
thereafter, as can be seen in panel C of Diagram 3. In the years 2007-
2009 large fiscal expansion took place. The public deficit neared 7 
percent of GDP in 2007, 10 percent in 2008 and 16 percent in 2009. The 
debt-to-GDP ratio shot from 107 percent to 129 percent in this period. 
This derailment was the proximate cause of fiscal crisis in 2010. Diagram 
4 focuses on the period 2004-2009 and shows total government receipts 
and expenditures, visualizing the magnitude of fiscal expansion in panel 
A. Panel B shows the GDP growth rate and panel C shows the current 
account deficit over the same period. (Please see Appendix A) 
A very visible syndrome is evident from the successive diagrams in 
panels A-C. As of 2007, a negative trend emerged in the growth rate. 
Furthermore, a very steep increase in the external deficit is also visible. 
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Faced with these negative indications, policy choices were limited. A 
policy of contraction would be very costly politically. A policy of 
expansion was far less painful and corresponded to the built-in mindset 
of the Greek political class. But why would that occur? In my 
interpretation, the only plausible explanation of the derailment of 2007-
9 is that overspending was a conscious policy choice that was legitimized 
by the goal of preventing the growth rate from declining any further.  
Prior Greek experience, as I noted, showed a negative relation between 
cost of borrowing and growth expectations. This led to a facile policy 
empiricism that embodied the traditional reflexes of populist fiscal 
management and its illusory premise that the economy would respond 
to fiscal stimulus as a closed system: If a boost of domestic demand 
could be engineered by public spending and income creation, this would 
protect growth expectations and maintain the high valuation (low 
interest) on debt. Unfortunately (and predictably) this proved 
completely wrong in an economy with free capital flows and, especially, 
with an unprecedented crisis looming. Domestic income creation proved 
unable to maintain the growth rate and fed a huge external account 
deficit. The circumstances were clearly much different from the earlier 
precondition that had watered the plant of populist fiscal expansions of 
the recent past. 
In 2008 the growth rate went into negative territory (-0.2 percent) after 
having been in positive territory for fifteen years. Yields on Greek debt 
rose considerably in 2008, for the first time in the euro era. By 2009, the 
inertia of fiscal expansion could not be reined in as all the dormant faults 
of the Greek fiscal system came alive. The new socialist government of 
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George Papandreou, which took over late in that year, also was captive 
of expansionist reflexes and proclaimed further expansion as a cure, 
misreading completely both the size of the crisis and the force of 
contagion in financial markets and open economies. The now famous 
phrase of Papandreou that ‘money can be found’ uttered in late 2009 
has a tragic ring to it, upon careful reading of the increased 
macroeconomic risks of Greece foreshadowed in 2003-4, and very visible 
as of 2007. Thus, the path was laid for a full-blown debt crisis in 2010. 
The Greek debt crisis energized all the dormant faults of euro-zone 
architecture, ushering in the adventure of ad-hoc, painful policies 
implemented since 2010. 
For a small open economy such as Greece, growth was indeed the path 
for maintaining social peace and mitigating distributional conflicts 
among powerful interest groups.  In the 1980s, this was achieved by 
inflationary growth and monetized debt. In the euro-era it was real 
growth based on external debt that acted as the lynchpin of domestic 
coherence. Thus, its maintenance through fiscal expansion appeared 
almost as a natural political response of last resort, which however 
proved both myopic and very toxic in the lopsided institutional 
environment of the Euro-zone that came face to face with 
unprecedented financial crisis.   
6. Epilogue: crisis management, strategic insurance and 
democracy 
 
Uncertainty, as John Maynard Keynes and Frank Knight had noted many 
decades ago, is never really measurable in probability terms. There are 
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always surprises and unanticipated turns or combinations of events. No 
mechanism for perfect prediction of crises has ever been possible in 
human history, nor will there ever be. There can only be imperfect 
defences against knowable but unpredictable threats.  
The state itself is such a mechanism of defence. Among its multiple 
functions, it has the duty of ‘insurer of last resort’: its very sovereignty 
affords powers of enforcement that allow it to marshal resources for 
unforeseen contingencies.  But resources are not simply stocks of food, 
fuel or money capital. They are also human and organizational 
capabilities that can be devoted to crisis management and to a system of 
protection of last resort. Yet in every crisis, there is dislocation of some 
kind and choices must be made on the allocation of protection. 
Democracy and its underpinning humanitarian foundations legitimize 
allocation in descending order of needfulness. Crises always increase 
inequality because the poor have no private means of protection and 
need public help. Yet, crisis management is also a dictatorial type of 
exercise: it requires large managerial discretion and centralization of 
information and coordination.  
When the crisis produces economic distress of the state itself, crisis 
management and the role of “insurer of last resort” suffer endogenous 
threats. It is not implausible that reserves held for bad times (stocks of 
goods, money capital, unused debt capacity) may be used up in last-
minute efforts to avoid (or postpone) crisis, leaving less room for 
handling events when the crisis actualizes.  Nor is it implausible that a 
state in crisis suffers deterioration of its organizational and human 
capital, as revenues and expenditures are violently constricted. These 
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plausible results imply an endogenous vicious circle: as the state 
becomes weaker or collapses, its ability to offer crisis management also 
vanishes. Greece, in the succession of events and policies that I 
recounted, was unprepared for a big crisis. It used up reserves to 
maintain social balance simultaneously with a rate of growth that could 
not be sustained for long. Its quality of public administration was (and 
still is) low and its inability to coordinate various parts of public policy 
even in good times was a harbinger of disaster, if and when bad times 
hit.  
Greece’s political class, its economic elites, its organized interests and its 
middle classes felt reassured that European participation provided them 
with safety and that the powerful European Monetary Union was 
impervious to crisis. Their complacency was certainly aided and abetted 
by optimistic markets and self-assured European bureaucrats. Yet, much 
of this reassurance was due to euphoria generated by a fair-weather 
system during good times. Institutional illusion, financial illusion and 
fiscal illusion merged into a grand illusion of perpetual peace, linear 
growth and stable prosperity. But the same complacency was blind to 
the fact that within the European artefact Greece was one of the 
weakest members and that its internal structures and institutions 
exposed it to greater risks than many other Euro-zone members.  
In the last analysis democracy, in the context of capitalism, is the 
bulwark of last resort for all legitimate social orders, but it must arm 
itself with structures that simultaneously promote innovative 
productivity while containing the growth of inequality. Ways must be 
found to enrich democracy’s survival toolkit with institutions of 
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governance and regulation that will assure foresight, reserve capacities, 
strategic thinking and resistance to consuming bouts of financial 
euphoria and fiscal illusion. 
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Appendix A  
 
Table 1: Indices of Economic Performance 1974-1989 (3-year averages) 
 
  1974-77 1978-80 1981-83 1984-86 1987-89 
Growth Rate of GDP 2,43% 3,74% -1,25% 1,68% 1,94% 
Annual Inflation 16,43% 18,82% 21,92% 20,26% 14,54% 
Fiscal Deficit / GDP NA NA -6,61% -9,06% -10,67% 
Current Account Deficit / GDP NA NA -4,18% -5,03% -2,25% 
 
Source:  Ameco (2012) Database 
 






































Debt/GDP GRD/USD Ex. Rate
 
Source: Ameco (2012) Database, Bloomberg 
Table 2: Indices of Economic Performance 1990-2000 (3-year averages) 
  1990-91 1992-94 1995-97 1998-2000 
Growth Rate of GDP 1,55% 0,37% 2,70% 3,75% 
Annual Inflation 19,94% 13,72% 7,56% 3,52% 
Taxes / GDP 16,92% 18,04% 19,07% 22,33% 
 
Source: Ameco Database
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Source: Ameco (2012) Database 
 
Diagram 3: Financial and Fiscal Indices 1997-2009 






















































































































































































Greek 10-year bond spread over German Rates
Source: Bloomberg 
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Diagram 3: Panel B: Critical Fiscal Magnitudes 1997-2009 
 
 
Source: Ameco (2012) Database 
Diagram 3: Panel C: Primary Fiscal Deficit – Current Account Deficit 
1997-2009 
 
Source: Ameco (2012) Database  
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Diagram 4: The Process of Destabilization 
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Source: Ameco (2012) Database 
 
Diagram 4: Panel B: Growth Rate of GDP 2004-2009 
 
Source: Ameco (2012) Database  
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